The Political Theory of Language
It is said 'true' referred to the supposed deceit of those who would not know their 'true' needs, interests, preferences, and they would not be 'truly free'. The distinctions merely linguistic problems do not solve our problems: We need principles morals and arguments that support them. We do not intend to answer the question of why there is a political philosophy. We want to affirm that it is always done, and who say they do not do it, they simply ambush, in a supposed apoliticism, as if they wanted to defend Heidegger - with surprising success - after the defeat of Nazism.
The political theory of language largely differentiates itself from the ideological and mythological theory of language.
I. Political words: Their use in the language
We are going to start showing a somewhat naive handling of a few political words where is easy to discern the problem of polysemy: talking from different conceptions of man, the person, life, freedom, from philosophical anthropologies different, from different value systems we can be using the same terms with very different meanings.
Politically correct thinking: If we want to end domination and violence, we must do it from pluralism and tolerance, so that the new democracies that we seek not to become a simple change of dominators by dominated and reciprocally, but in the realm of justice. Political justice and social, for the masses of the neglected, excluded, oppressed in general, of our peoples. It's not about eliminating conflict - the conflict can never be eliminated, only covered up by time- it's about building institutions that allow living in radical respect, of the others. That is about creating unity in diversity.
Then the problems emerge: the words policies, like 'people' or 'power', are words stained with blood. The vocation of words policies is to become flags. Tolerating 'is a political word, it is not simply accepting differences with joy, deny them, hide them, is suffering, "endure and understand". It is less close to acceptance and that is why there exist naturally ineliminable prohibitions in all framework of democratic coexistence, but we must try to reduce them, expanding the scope of the tolerance or to change the word to acceptance.
When we talk about tolerating, we are talking about what we frankly dislike, but that we are willing to allow it to happen (be an act or an activity, or even a set of them that configure a way of living, one(s) practice(s) that disgusts us. We must not confuse tolerance with indifference. Tolerating the different is not tolerating the oppression of the oppressor. Tolerance is a commitment, to eliminate the barriers that separate peoples and groups within the villages and even the people within the groups. The oppressor is tolerated, as a person – and still loves it - preventing him from oppressing.
'Trust' is the political word of today. When Americans say trust, and there it looks, in the green tickets that say “In God we trust”. In this secularized world, crossed by the forces of incessant capitalist accumulation and the struggle capital - to prevent the decline in the rates of profit, in this globalized world by the scientific-technological revolution according to interests of the powerful, it is convenient to think about our trust, confidence in ourselves, in this world that we have to build in democracy.
Confidence is a political word, that is, a compromised word and that implies a commitment. Confidence in the future, in the future of our peoples. Confidence in ourselves and in our own forces. Trust in history, that we do not know where it's going, but what we want to build for our children and the children of our adversaries. Confidence in the future of our world without distinctions and finally without flags. We said that in these few words, it is easy to discern the problem of polysemy: speaking from different conceptions of man, person, life, freedom, from different philosophical anthropologies, from systems of different values we can be using the same terms with very different meanings.
In a paragraph entitled "The inadequacy of linguistic analysis "referred to the resolution of the problem of political freedom, or rather to the uses of linguistic terms of the term 'freedom' in contexts politicians, Raz notes that he does not suggest that linguistic distinctions are arbitrary or inconsistent, but that those distinctions do not solve our problems: What we need are moral principles and arguments that base. (Raz, 1986: 15) As Bernard Williams said, in the second half of the twentieth century, “Contemporary moral philosophy has found an original way of being boring which consists in not discussing moral issues (...) the desire to minimize moral commitment manifest and to use moral arguments only as irrefragably illustrative leaves the impression that all important matters they have been left out” (Williams, 1972/87: 12).
We can try to say why we do what we do: we understand that it is a vocation and a destiny, inextricably linked with the commitment to the broader deployment of the freedom and compliance with human rights in general and not in a utopian or unattainable place, here, in the bosom of our history.